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As ever, you can only get a negotiated agreement if both sides to an agreement want to negotiate. There is no sign currently that Iran wants to negotiate. Therefore it is likely to be fairly futile for the West to concentrate on answers like structuring the process (eg by holding talks in Iran-friendly Turkey) or focusing on the content of a deal (eg by insisting that Iran should swap potential nuclear rods for technology).

This discussion will only get anywhere if Iran wants to negotiate. All efforts should therefore be focused on persuading Iran that it has more to gain from negotiations than it has to lose. However unpalatable it may sound, this means addressing some of Iran’s needs in the conversation.

Iran has a desire to belong to that senior club of nations that exercises nuclear power. It also has a need for respect – indeed the 2 needs are intertwined. The real issue for the West in the negotiation is therefore how to meet those needs without Iran actually developing nuclear weapons. Re-phrasing the question in that way may enable the West to make progress.

This is a response to the Wall Street Journal Article ‘West, Iran Take Hard Lines for Nuclear Talks’

What is the Government’s need in the negotiation with Newscorp over its acquisition of the remaining shares in BSkyB? Firstly, the Government is anxious it will lose respect in the eyes of the electorate if it is seen to be kow-towing to Mr. Murdoch. In negotiating terms this is a “respect need”.

Equally, it needs to be seen to be acting sympathetically to Mr. Murdoch so it can continue to have his support. In negotiation terms this is a “belonging need”.

The delay in the publication of Ofcom’s report may be attributable to the Government struggling to reconcile these 2 conflicting needs.

This may result in some fudge which makes it look as though the Government is acting strongly and independently whilst not really harming , Newscorp’s interests. A referral to the Competition Commission would fall into this category.

Alternatively, it may be that the Government simply has to choose between these two conflicting needs.

In the hierarchy of negotiating needs, a “belonging need” will always require fulfilling before a “respect need”, so if it has to choose, if the Government has to choose, it’s more likely that satisfying Mr. Murdoch will come first.

Given that a military victory in Afghanistan is impossible for the West to achieve, the only option is a negotiated solution of some kind. This is difficult for a number of reasons;

– The West and in particular the US needs to accept that a negotiated solution is not necessarily a defeat

– The Taliban will need to be included in any such negotiated solution

– There are many other stakeholders in any such negotiation, and all their needs will have to be addressed – not least a local population large parts of which appears to be hostile to the West, anti-Taliban, and very sceptical of their own corrupt Government.

For all these challenges though, the only alternative to negotiation is indefinite military intervention or the abandonment’s of the West’s hopes of ever creating a stable Afghan regime which is not a home to extremism.

In response to original article (theatlantic.com)

The real negotiation here may well have been about things other than the US budget deficit.

Politicians are often involved in “positional” negotiations where the intended target to be influenced is someone other the person across the table. There is another dynamic as well. All negotiators have a personal emotional agenda which has nothing to do with the organisational interests they represent. These personal needs might be to do with e.g. a need for respect or esteem or reassurance.

In the case of the budget deficit the positional requirements of the negotiators and the individual emotional needs of the negotiators involved will all have pointed to an imperative to get the deal done. Nobody involved would have benefited from a shutdown.

Response to Erik Sherman’s Article (bnet.com)

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Vodafone’s policy of selling off minority stakes shows how its negotiating priorities have changed. It used to be the case that mobile operators were simply interested in growing user numbers, so it made sense to be in as many territories as possible, even those where only minority stakes could be obtained.

Now attention has switched to revenues per user (ARPU) and retention of paying customers. These attributes are easier to influence when you have control over the company.

Vodafone’s challenge in implementing its new policy may just be that it has made such a public statement about what it intends to do, that its co-shareholders are going to see it coming and hang tough in negotiations. So, it is going to have to work hard to secure good prices for its minority stakes. One thing Vodafone may have to do is to make sure it is always has a “BATNA” (a best alternative to a negotiated agreement) – including hanging on to its stakes. That way it will not look desperate to strike a deal and can hold out for a better price.

Response to original article (guardian.co.uk)

Negotiation is the only answer ultimately, unless the Coalition not only wants to remove Gaddafi but also capture him and put him on trial. What the coalition forces need to decide is “what constitutes a win” in this negotiation. If it’s just getting Gaddafi to step down then a negotiated solution might achieve that. But, if you negotiate then you normally have to give something back in return. So if a negotiated deal is struck then it may be that part of the price is that Gaddafi and his henchmen escape justice and are given safe passage.

If the “win” is not only getting rid of Gaddafi but bringing him to account for his murderous regime, then even greater military action will be required. However, even if we send in an army as well as an air force there is no guarantee of a successful outcome, as our experience in Iraq shows. So, without negotiation the “win” will be much harder to achieve.

Response to original article (guardian.co.uk)

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It’s not surprising to hear Bertelsmann rumbling about buying EMI Publishing and/or Warner Publishing. It must always have annoyed them that they had to let BMG Publishing go in the wake of the Sony BMG Records merger. Having re-constituted BMG Rights as a replacement publishing vehicle it has grown quickly, but the opportunity to add Warner Chappell and/or EMI would help accelerate growth exponentially.

The question is, how ambitious will they be in their bidding? Bertelsmann have traditionally been very conservative in their bidding. There was a slew of sales of independent record companies in the 90’s – Virgin, A and M, Island, MCA. Bertelsmann was always involved in these car auctions – kicking tyres, but never buying. Sales of publishing catalogues are never just about price, but tradition says Bertelsmann would need to work hard on the other benefits they bring in order to avoid being outbid by competitors again.