clive

It was timely for the Prime Minister of Pakistan to visit China last week (see article here) as an alliance with a partner of this kind potentially gives Pakistan extra “scale” or “weight” in its discussions with the US, and these are recognised sources of bargaining power.

However, on closer scrutiny this development probably makes little difference to US/Pakistan relations. The Pakistan government has “security” negotiating needs with the US – fulfilled by large supplies of cash and other resources. It also has a constant domestic negotiation going on with its own radicalised Islamic population where it also has “security” needs – hence its ambivalent attitude to the war on terror.

China has an interest in friendly relations with Pakistan, but it is unlikely to want to supplant the US as a major supplier of cash and other resources. Equally, China, with a large Muslim population of its own which it wants to control, is unlikely to be any more in favour of Pakistan’s semi-tolerant attitude to extremists than the US is.

If, as a result of this, the US does not feel that there is any real threat that Pakistan could ever substitute China for its relationship with the US in its international dealings, then the US is unlikely to feel too anxious or threatened about a one-off visit by the Pakistan Prime Minister to China.

The successful negotiations in California between the Health Services and the fast food chains (see article here) is a good example of how “visualisation” behaviour can help people “join” together in a negotiation. The parents of those committed to fast food could visualise how a healthy regime would benefit future generations of their kids, and the fast food chains could visualise an opportunity to capture more (currently healthy eating) customers, as well as, no doubt scoring points for social responsibility. The article calls this “inventive negotiation”.

Once you can see that both parties want to join then it’s possible to find “coinage” on both sides to cement the deal. “Coinage” is a low value concession from one side that meets a high value need on the other. So, it doesn’t cost a fast food outlet much to provide apples and milk as an alternative, because either way they are still going to sell something to customers (whether it’s fast or healthy food). Equally the fast food families had nothing to lose by joining in with the scheme since all they were agreeing to do was visit fast food outlets they wanted to go to anyway.

Joining behaviour is great in some cases, but can only work where it’s genuinely possible to visualise and paint a picture of future outcomes that encourages people to “join”. That is not possible in every negotiation, and sometimes the parties resent moves to “join”, particularly if they are suggested too early in the process or there are some bitter feelings dividing the parties. So, it was a great tactic here and can be a very helpful tactic often, but won’t always work….

It was interesting to observe President Obama’s recent visit to the UK and what this tells us about the UK-US alliance.

The US holds most of the bargaining aces in any dealings with the UK. It has greater scale, numbers, market power and network power. The UK potential aces are mainly available to the US as well (expertise, information and personal power). Oddly the UK probably has some imputed “authority” power from its history and its traditions (the Queen, Parliament, etc.). No surprise then to see the UK working that source of power jolly hard whilst Obama was here.

One problem in dealing with Obama though is that mainly he doesn’t seem to like striking deals. He makes engaging statements and exudes good will, but he seems to like keeping options open rather than making commitments. This may be why he was unwilling to be drawn on issues where the UK would have liked more commitment from him – for example Libya, and Budget deficit management. This may partly explain Obama’s popularity – he never disenfranchises anybody. It makes it harder though if, like the UK, you want to get deals out of him and you don’t hold many aces.

In response to article here (bbc.co.uk)

If rumours of a potential deal between Facebook and Spotify are true then it’s easy to see the attractions on both sides.

Facebook gets to bolt on a ready-made populist music service. Spotify suddenly has access to a major global platform as an incentive to tip the Majors into allowing it into the US. One issue that could arise is that the Majors seem keen to ensure that any US version of the service is paid for.

However, Facebook users will expect the service to be free – after all they don’t have to pay for anything else on Facebook. They are though, used to seeing adverts. Spotify of course became successful very quickly by launching primarily as a free service (with adverts).

Spotify has seemingly been torn between keeping the free element and migrating the service to a premium one – it can’t really afford the Major’s advances/guarantees and royalties unless it does. On the other hand a deal with Facebook could turn that logic on its head, and Spotify may argue that if it is going to deliver potential access to hundreds of millions of users then the free model is the way to go.

In response to article here (techland.time.com)

The Palestinian stated aim of going to the UN in September to seek a resolution in favour of statehood is classic pressure tactic. It puts the US somewhat on the horns of a dilemma. Back such a resolution and they would be accused of endorsing terrorism (as things stand Hamas is back in the fold as a participant in the Palestinian Authority). Veto any such resolution and the US will be accused of being insincere about finding a resolution that addresses Palestinian needs. It’s small wonder that the US is currently spending a lot of energy trying to move Middle East negotiations forward.

This kind of pressure tactic has its dangers though. First the US may not like being put under pressure – few of us do. This may undo some US goodwill that presently exists towards the Palestinian cause.

Secondly going to the UN may not secure the Palestinians the kind of decisive resolution they want. Once the UN is debating the issue all sorts of political self-interest and horse trading between countries will influence the outcome – none of which the Palestinians can control.

Thirdly, Israel is unlikely to be moved by any such resolution – quite the reverse. Ultimately this conflict can only be resolved by the parties themselves wanting peace. In order to achieve that all concerned, including the US and the Palestinians should be working on incentivising that state of mind rather than using pressure tactics.

In response to article here (thespec.com)

Often pressure tactics can create more problems than they solve. That applies here too, whether it’s the players and their Association taking matters through the Courts or the owners staging lockouts. Use of pressure is a legitimate negotiating tactic but you have to be careful in its use.

Firstly it always risks de-railing the climate of the negotiation as this is “push” behaviour and nobody likes being pushed around, so it raises the temperature.

Secondly, if you are going to exert this kind of pressure, you have to be prepared to see it all the way through. If you start and then back off, the other side will think you are not serious and your negotiation authority is undermined.

So, in this case the players have to be prepared potentially to run actions all the way through the Courts, at enormous cost and risk, and the owners have to be prepared to proceed with lockouts for as long as it takes. Whilst all that is going on, energy is diverted away from the real task at hand, namely to find a negotiated or mediated solution that meets everybody’s needs.

In response to article here (nashvillecitypaper.com)

The latest problems concerning the Greek bail-out are not a surprise.

From a negotiating point of view it’s critical the other side believes what you say. This is an ongoing negotiation between the Financial Markets and the Eurozone countries in which the Markets do not believe what the Eurozone countries and their financial institutions are saying. They do not believe that struggling countries like Greece will meet their debt reduction targets. Nor do they believe that the Eurozone will keep pumping in money indefinitely to support these failing economies.

So, the Markets will keep putting on pressure to raise interest rates in these countries until their debt becomes completely unsustainable. The only answer is surely to:

1) Negotiate a restructuring of the debt for countries like Greece so that it actually reduce in size
2) Tackle a reform of the Euro currency head-on, possibly including releasing countries like Greece from the currency.

This might trigger a short term panic as the current debt holders have to take a haircut on their loans, but if it’s part of a believable reform package going forward, it might just work. Once the pretense is dropped that struggling economies like Greece and Portugal are sufficiently aligned to that of Euro giants such as Germany that they can form part of the same currency, then the markets may start believing in the Euro again.

It looks as though preliminary talks are taking place between US representatives and the Taliban to try to initiate a negotiated peace agreement or ‘power-sharing’ deal in Afghanistan. It would be great to believe that these peace talks could get somewhere but it seems unlikely at the moment.

The Taliban have no need to negotiate given that the allies have made clear they will be exiting Afghanistan soon in any event. They can just sit it out. The Taliban also don’t have a coherent leadership structure – how can you negotiate when you don’t really know who is leading the other team?

The Allied team is also likely to be highly disunited as there is luke-warm commitment to Karzai’s somewhat unreliable regime, and yet its involvement in any negotiations is pretty essential. In addition, the climate of the negotiation must be awful after 10 years of military action by the US and UK. This kind of “hostile” climate cannot be re-set just like that.

Miracles can happen in negotiations but the set-up here is far from ideal.

The key comment in the excellent article “Dealing with kidnappers” by Hazel Davis (ft.com) comes when hostage negotiator, Dr James Alvarez, remarks that “people’s behaviour isn’t random. There’s a psycho-logic usually, but finding this out comes from listening and having a quick mind”.

Everybody has certain filters through which they interpret the world which become ingrained as patterns of thought or “Meta-Programmes”, and it’s these patterns of thought which determine our behaviour.

You can often pick these patterns up through the language people use. For example, some people interpret the world through their emotions or senses – they will say things like “It doesn’t feel right” or “Something smells fishy”. Some people filter the world through mental pictures, and will say things like “that looks great” or “I get the picture”. Some people interpret the world through auditory cues – they may say things like “I hear what you say” or “tell me more about…”.

There are many other such programmes. Some people think in big chunks, and some prefer to focus on detail. Some people are optimistic; some always think disaster is just around the corner. Some move towards outcomes; others like to avoid them.

As a negotiator it’s really important to pick up these cues. If you can interpret them correctly you can then model your own behaviour and language so that you match the “programme” being displayed on the other side. This will make it more likely that you are able to influence them, as you will be using the same cues that they use to interpret the world.

The stakes may be much higher in kidnap negotiations but the process of interpreting what makes the other side tick is the […]

It may or may not be true that the Libyan Government is negotiating with the rebels. In some ways it is hard to believe since the Government has adopted a classic “loser” stance in its battle with the rebels. It knows it cannot win so it becomes more important to inflict damage on the other side then to try and negotiate a solution that would suit both sides.

That attitude is the product of the allies view towards Libya, which now seems resolved that Gaddafi should be removed by military force. The adoption of this attitude really leaves the Libyan Government with nowhere to go, because even if it tries to broker a peace with the rebels, the allies couldn’t stand by and allow a deal to be created which would somehow leave Gaddafi in power of some or all of the country. That would contradict all the military effort and expense of trying to remove him, and their very public statements about the need for Gaddafi to go.

So, as in day-to-day deal-making, the adoption of a very public “no compromise” approach, as the allies have adopted here, makes it hard for either side to negotiate a compromise in which they both get something out of a deal…